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SYMPOSIUM
Suppose It's Not True: Challenging
Mediation Ideology
DeborahR. Hensler
I. INTRODUCTION
Across the country, people who file lawsuits are being diverted from
adjudication to mediation. Whereas once mediation was seen as the preferred means
of resolving family disputes (especially those involving child custody), now it is
mandated for a broad range of civil disputes. Whereas once citizens were called upon
to volunteer as mediators in community justice centers outside the courts, now
mediation is a line of business for lawyers whose customers are sent to them by the
courts. Whereas once dispute resolution theorists called on courts to provide a
variety of procedural choices for civil disputants, now courts order litigants to
mediate and sanction them when they refuse to do so.
A decade ago, decision-makers justified mandating mediation of lawsuits for
money damages on the grounds that mediation would save courts and litigants time
and money. Now that empirical evidence to support this claim has failed to
materialize,' decision-makers justify mandating mediation on the grounds that
litigants prefer it to traditional litigation. Suppose that's not true. Suppose it's the
otherway around- suppose, infact, litigants in disputes over money damagesprefer
adversariallitigation with the chance of adjudication to mediation under court
auspices. The idea that litigants might prefer adversarial processes with the
opportunity to adjudicate civil disputes to less adversarial consensual processes may
startle judges and legislators who have enthusiastically embraced mediation. But it
is consistent with the observation that voluntary court mediation programs rarely
attract significant numbers ofcivil damage lawsuits. Moreover, the idea that litigants
might prefer adversarial litigation and adjudication is consistent with a long line of
social psychological research on individuals' evaluations of different dispute
resolution procedures.
Where did the idea that Americans who bring their disputes to court prefer
mediation to adversary process and adjudication come from? How can empirical
research on dispute resolution help us assess this claim? What would a system of
dispute resolution based on litigants'preferences -- rather than lawyers' self-interest
or judges' beliefs about their appropriate role -- look like?

1. Deborah Hensler, In Search of "Good Mediation": Rhetoric, Practice and Empiricism, in
Handbook of Justice Research in Law 231 (Joseph Sanders & Lee Hamilton eds., Kluver
Academia/Plenum 2001).
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H. THE IDEA OF A PREFERENCE FOR MEDIATION2
At the outset, I want to make clear that I am not questioning the appeal of
mediation in many circumstances. 3 For example, when relatives, friends or
neighbors cannot see their own way out of a conflict they may benefit from getting
the help of a mediator in sorting things out, rather than escalating the conflict or
letting it simmer. Such disputes rarely end up in court, but when they do, it is not
untoward for a court to suggest that the disputants attempt to mediate outside of
court, rather than litigate. I also do not question the appeal of mediation in public
policy disputes involving large numbers of stakeholders with diverse interests.
These disputes are inherently political, and they are more likely to result in outcomes
that provide at least something of value to each stakeholder when they are negotiated
-- with the assistance of mediators, if necessary -- than when they are thrown to the
courts for adjudication. I applaud efforts to mediate intractable group-based
conflicts, where the alternative to talk is violence. I do not question the wisdom of
courts providing mediation -- or even insisting on it -- in family custody disputes,
where there is a public policy interest in helping divorcing parents maintain a
sufficiently positive relationship to enable them to care adequately for their children.
I do, however, think courts should take more responsibility than they have to date
for determining whether the programs they mandate actually improve outcomes for
children.
Most courts' civil calendars, however, do not comprise large numbers ofpublic
policy disputes, intractable group-based disputes or quarrels between family
members and neighbors, and family law cases often are assigned to a separate court
calendar. Civil calendars do contain large numbers of disputes between strangers
(e.g. victims and perpetrators of accidents) and other people whose relationships are
not intimate (e.g. employers and employees, business firms and consumers). My
focus is the expansion of court-mandated mediation to these disputes, for which the
traditional remedy is monetary compensation. It is this expansion of court-mandated
mediation that appears to be responsible for most of the growth of mediation in the
legal arena in the past decade. And it is this expansion of court-mandated mediation
that appears to be responsible for reshaping how judges view the role of the courts."

2. There is a substantial literature on procedural preferences in non-U.S. cultures, and a smaller but
significant literature comparing preferences across cultures. My focus is on the preferences ofAmericans
who bring civil suits for money damages.
3. I also am not arguing against negotiating civil legal disputes. For the purposes of this paper, I
assume that courts order litigants to mediation when bilateral bargaining has failed.

4. Those who are accustomed to judges urging mediation upon them may be surprised to learn that
many judges embraced mediation reluctantly. The idea of expanding mediation to the courts was first
promoted by ADR enthusiasts in the legal academy (most notably Frank Sander), and later by corporate
counsel, under the banner of the Civil Justice Reform Task Force and such organizations as the
American Corporate Counsel Association and the Center for Public Resources. Mostjudges and courts
came late to the party.
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The notion that civil litigants with money damage disputes prefer mediation to
adversarial litigation and adjudication is so ingrained in contemporary legal culture
that it is rarely questioned. One source of this notion may be the intuition that
humans generally prefer peace to war, harmony to conflict. That humans ought to
strive for such goals is a central tenet of many religions. But the evidence that

humans' preferences for harmony over conflict and cooperation over contest vary
dramatically depending on social, cultural and personal circumstances is all around
us. 5 6 For eons, political theorists focused on conflict and competition in human
affairs. Contemporary American academicians' engagement with conflict resolution
and conflict prevention theories has its roots in the post- World War IHefforts of a
small group of social psychologists to redirect attention to the potential for
cooperation in human interaction.
Their efforts were likely spurred by
contemplation of the consequences of the century's two world wars, the nuclear arms
race, battles for national independence and racial and ethnic struggles within nations.
The social psychologists were primarily interested in group conflict and the effects
of personal differences and culture on conflict behavior. The notion that their
theories and empirical results might apply to legal disputes came later.
Another possible source of the notion that Americans with civil money damage
disputes prefer mediation to litigation and adjudication are surveys of litigant
satisfaction with their court experiences. The idea that one ought to ask litigants what
they think of their experiences in court was itself a product of the alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) movement. Initially, many lawyers and judges were concerned
that substituting alternative procedures for traditional litigation and adjudication of
civil money disputes might have negative consequences for litigants." Litigant
satisfaction surveys conducted after people had experienced an ADR procedure were
the primary tools that courts used to assess consequences, and generally they found
that litigants surveyed were more "satisfied" than "dissatisfied." But knowing that
litigants are "satisfied" with mediation tells us little about preferences for mediation

5. I write as the United States struggles to understand the motivations for the September I1 attacks

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. While these events underline the importance of the quest
for peace, they sadly support the claim that there are circumstances in which people choose conflict over
peace for what they believe are justifiable reasons.
6. There is a long line ofpsychological research investigating the relative contributions of personality
and situational variables to conflict resolution preferences. The empirical results are mixed, leaving some
theorists to argue that conflict resolution preferences are determined by the circumstances of conflict,
while others argue that people exhibit consistent personality linked preferences across conflict domains.
For a discussion of the literature and additional data, see Robert Steinberg & Lawrence Soriano, Styles
of Conflict Resolution, 47 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. ItS (1984).
7. For example, in somejurisdictions,judges opposed the introduction of court-mandated non-binding
arbitration. See Deborah Hensler, Albert Lipson & Elizabeth Rolph, JudicialArbitration in California
9 (RAND 1981). The American Bar Association was initially skeptical of the value ofalternative dispute
resolution. It was not until 1993 that the ABA formally recognized the Section on Alternative Dispute
Resolution. Prior to that, ABA members who were interested in ADR were relegated to standing
committees and the like.
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-- litigants might be even more satisfied with a different procedure if it were offered
to them.8 9
The idea that Americans should prefer mediation to litigation and adjudication
may have received a boost from the decades long tort reform campaign by the
business community, which sometimes is framed as a critique of litigiousness and
other times as a critique of lawyers. To disputants, mediation's harmony ideology
offers an alternative to litigiousness, which often is portrayed as the rigid and
overweening pursuit of individual rights to the exclusion of other social goals. To
lawyers, mediation practice offers an opportunity to abandon the role of
troublemaker for the role of problem-solver. However, the legitimacy of antilitigation arguments for court-mandated mediation is undercut by extensive
empirical evidence demonstrating that the litigation explosion is largely mythical,
and that most Americans never consider claiming when they are injured and only
rarely pursue rights claims. Similarly, while opinion survey data suggest that many
Americans agree that lawyers often put their own interests above the public's or their
clients,' they also suggest that Americans value their ability to find lawyers to
represent them when they have been injured or wronged. In any event, neither
statistical data about claiming rates nor public opinion surveys about lawyers lead
directly to the conclusion that left to their own devices most Americans would prefer
mediation to adversarial litigation and adjudication.
Finally, judges and lawyers themselves may be important sources of the notion
that litigants prefer mediation to litigation and adjudication. Curiously, judges and
litigators, who devote significant portions of their time to preparing for and (with
ever decreasing frequency) participating in trials, assume that most other people
abhor the process. "Isn't there a better way?" Chief Justice Warren Burger asked
twenty years ago --a way to resolve civil disputes that would be faster, cheaper and
that would minimize "the emotional stress [that is] inescapable in the litigation
process."'" There have been few attempts to investigate this common assumption.
But one of the few studies that actually inquired about civil litigants' attitudes
towards their trial experiences found that these lay persons felt that they understood
the trial process and were able to participate in it, and that their trial provided a
dignified and careful procedure for resolving their disputes." While this study did
not provide evidence that lay-persons prefer trial to mediation, it does raise questions

8. More generally, since satisfaction is a subjective variable that cannot (currently) be measured
physically, satisfaction ratings are only meaningful in a comparative context - e.g. satisfaction with the
President's performance over time, satisfaction with one laundry product, compared to another.
9. Additionally, studies of preferences for mediation over bargaining may be interpreted as showing
a general preference for mediation. Disputants may view mediation positively because it permits
compromise without losing face or because it helps to maintain an emotionally "cool" interaction.
However, such preferences tell us nothing about the choice between consensual processes and
adversarial adjudication.
10. Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 ABA J. 274 (1982). The Chief Justice did not
specify what aspects of the litigation process were emotionally stressful, but urged consideration of
"nonjudicial routes." Id. at 275.
11. E. Allan Lind et al., The Perceptionof Justice: Tort Litigants' Views of Trial, Court-Annexed
Arbitration,andJudicialSettlement Conferences 74 (RAND 1989).
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about the assumption that civil litigants' reactions to trial are overwhelmingly
negative.
In sum, on closer look, the notion that Americans who believe they have a legal
claim prefer to resolve such claims through mediation rather than adversarial
litigation and adjudication seems to be based on questionable assumptions and
debatable extrapolations from other social conflict contexts.
1m. WHAT EMPIRICAL STUDIES TELL US ABOUT PROCEDURAL
PREFERENCES
Luckily, if we want to understand legal disputants' procedural preferences we
do not have to rely solely on our sometimes-flawed intuitions.' For more than
twenty-five years, social psychologists have been investigating people's procedural
choices and assessments across a wide variety of conflict situations, including legal
disputes. What has come to be called "procedural justice" research began in a
laboratory about twenty-five years ago when social psychologist John Thibaut and
lawyer Laurens Walker teamed up to study individual preferences for different forms
of dispute resolution. 3 Thibaut and Walker initially focused on preferences for
different forms of adjudication. Using conventional psychological experimentation
methods and student research subjects, they investigated whether individuals
preferred a U.S.-style adversarial trial process or an inquisitorial trial process similar
to that used in many European courts for deciding criminal cases.' 4 In this, as well
as many subsequent studies, Thibaut and Walker measured preferences by
comparing subjects' ratings of satisfaction and fairness across procedures to which
they randomly assigned the subjects. 5 In some instances, the researchers gave the
experimental subjects information about a dispute and their role in the dispute, and
then asked them to rate the procedure to which they were assigned. In other
instances, the researchers gave the subjects facts about a dispute and assigned them
to a role, asked the subjects to participate in simulated dispute resolution procedures

12. That people's social intuitions are often incorrect has been demonstrated in a long line of social
psychological research. See Lee Ross, Naive Realism: Implications for Social Conflict and
Misunderstanding,in Values and Knowledge (T. Brown, E. Reed & E. Turiel eds., Erlbaum Assoc.
1997).
13. Most of the publications that derive from this research were co-authored by Thibaut and Walker
and their students. By convention, the research is usually attributed to the former, even when they do
not appear as lead authors. I follow this convention.
14. Laurens Walker, Stephen LaTour, E. Allan Lind, & John Thibaut, Reactions ofParticipantsand
Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. App. Soc. Psychol. 295 (1974). In the experimental
manipulation, the adversarial procedure allowed student subjects who were playing the role of criminal
defendants to choose their attorneys (played by law students), who then presented evidence on their
behalf to a "judge." In the inquisitorial procedure, a single attorney was assigned to present both
prosecutorial and defense evidence to the "judge." Id. at 300.
15. In some instances, however, Thibaut and Walker's students presented subjects with multiple
procedures, asked them to rate each procedure, and compared ratings. This approach has some technical
weaknesses, but because it requires fewer subjects than the approach described in the text it is less
expensive and easier to carry out.
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to which they were randomly assigned, and then asked them to rate the procedure in
which they had participated.'"
Thibaut and Walker found, that subjects who were assigned the roles of
defendants in a criminal case were more satisfied with the adversarial trial procedure,
which the subjects perceived as fairer than a more inquisitorial trial procedure. 7 This
finding held true whether the "defendants" were judged innocent or guilty in the
simulated procedure. Thibaut and Walker interpreted their results as indicating that
individuals preferred procedures that allowed them to control the process (i.e.
through adversarial presentation of evidence) to procedures in which process control
was ceded to a third-party (as in an inquisitorial trial procedure).
In follow-up research, Thibaut and Walker and their associates broadened their
investigation to include preferences regarding decision (i.e. outcome) control and
civil legal disputes. 9 In this line of research, subjects were told that they either
controlled the presentation of evidence or not, and that they either controlled the
ultimate decision or not. The researchers combined different levels ofprocedural and
outcome control, thereby creating five procedural options. In their research reports,
the researchers termed these procedural options bilateral bargaining (i.e. negotiation
without third party intervention), mediation, the moot, arbitration, and autocratic
decision-making -- terms which were carried forward in subsequent research -- but
the experimental subjects themselves were not given these descriptors.
As is frequently true in conversations about dispute resolution procedures, the
researchers did not (seemingly) pay a great deal of attention to the terminology they
chose to describe the procedures. But they did include descriptions of the procedures
in their research reports. Based on these descriptions, what the researchers termed
"mediation" most resembled non-binding arbitration of the type mandated by many

16. In these early studies, the researchers ignored possible differences in ex ante and ex post
preferences. Later research found differences in these preferences. See e.g. Tom Tyler, Yuen Huo, &
E. Allan Lind, The Two Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing Antecedents ofPre-Experience
Choices and Post-Experience Evaluations, 2 Group Processes & Intergroup Rel. 99 (1999).
17. The researchers noted that the results might have reflected cultural expectations of American
students whose observations of adjudication (e.g. through the media) would likely have been limited to
adversarial proceedings. But they cited unpublished data from a French study that found similar
preferences for adversarial procedure among Parisian students to controvert the cultural hypothesis.
Thibaut & Walker, supra n. 14, at 309. Later procedural justice research has found remarkably little
variation in results across cultures. See e.g. E. Allan Lind, Bonnie Erickson, Nehemia Friedland, &
Michael Dickenberger, Reactions to ProceduralModelsfor Adjudicative ConflictResolution: A CrossNationalStudy, 22 J. Conflict Res. 318,322 (1978); E. Allan Lind, Tom Tyler & Yuen Huo, Procedural
Context and Culture: Variation in the Antecedents ofProcedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. Pers. & Soc.
Psychol. 767 (1997).
18. Increasing controversy over civil discovery in the 1970s seems to have played a role in shaping
Thibaut and Walker's research. See e.g. E. Allan Lind, John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Discoveryand
Presentationof Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1973);
John Thibaut, Laurens Walker & E. Allan Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking,86 Harv. L. Rev. 386 (1972); Jon Thibaut, Laurens Walker, Stephen LaTour & Pauline
Houlden, ProceduralJustice as Fairness, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1245 (1974).
19. See e.g. Pauline Houlden, Stephen LaTour, Laurens Walker and John Thibaut, Preferencesfor
Modes ofDisputeResolution as a Function of ProcessandDecision Control, 14 J. Exper. Soc. Psychol.
13 (1978).
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courts during the 1980s: the parties (with or without the help of lawyers) presented
the evidence that supported their side of the dispute, a neutral third party heard the
evidence -- but did not discuss it with the disputants -- and then rendered an advisory
non-binding opinion. The third party did not caucus with the parties or otherwise test
their willingness to accept alternate resolutions of the dispute, nor did he attempt to
identify the parties' interests so as to facilitate an integrative resolution. In other
words, the procedure looked neither like evaluative mediation, nor like facilitative
mediation (and there was certainly nothing transformative about it).2" What the
researchers termed "arbitration" was identical to the process they described as
mediation, except for the fact that the third party neutral rendered a binding
decision. 2 The researchers discovered that while individuals preferred procedures
that allowed them to maintain process control, within the set of procedures that
offered such control, subjects preferred procedures that ceded decision-making
power to a neutral third party. Subjects tended to view such procedures as fairer than
procedures offering other combinations of process and decision control. The
researchers reasoned that these preferences reflected the subjects' belief that
controlling the process accorded them the best opportunity to present evidence
favoring their position, while ceding control over the outcome offered the best
opportunity to resolve the conflict with an outcome that reflected the relative weight
of the evidence on each participant's side.22

20. Actually, in these experiments the third party was a confederate of the researcher who simply
followed a script, listening first to the evidence presented by the parties and then rendering a predetermined and randomly assigned advisory decision. My point is that the process simulated in these
experiments looked little like mediation as practiced today, either in its evaluative form or in its
facilitative form.
Not all procedural justice researchers have described mediation to subjects as outlined in the text. For
example, in studies exploring differences in procedural preference across cultures, Leung and colleagues
described mediation as a process in which a third party appointed by the court provides the disputants
with "guidance and suggestions" as they try to reach a "mutually acceptable solution through negotiation
and bargaining." See Kwok Leung, Some Determinantsof Reactions to ProceduralModelsfor Conflict
Resolution: A Cross-CulturalStudy, 53 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 898 (1987). Using a simulated dispute
arising out of a traffic accident, Leung asked subjects in the U.S. and Hong Kong to choose among four
procedures: bargaining, mediation, inquisitorial adjudication and adversarial adjudication. Hong Kong
subjects strongly preferred mediation to all other procedures, but they preferred adversary adjudication
to bi-lateral bargaining. Americans favored mediation and adversary adjudication equally and strongly
preferred both to inquisitorial adjudication or bargaining. Subjects in both cultures viewed adjudication
as the fairest procedure. Id. at 903. See also Kwok Leung et al., Effects of Cultural Femininity on
PreferenceforMethods ofConflict Processing:A Cross-CulturalStudy, 26 J. Exper. Soc. Psychol. 373
(1990).
21. The "moot" required the parties and a third party all to agree on an outcome after parties presented
evidence. In the autocratic procedure, a third party collected all the evidence and made the decision.
Houlden et al., supran. 19, at 14. It is difficult to think of any analogue to the moot in the domestic U.S.
legal system, but there are examples of processes that require consensus in the international sphere. For
example, the World Trade Association formally requires that all participants in its trade rounds agree
to decisions. In practice, however, more powerful countries dominate the process. Richard H. Steinberg,
In the Shadow ofLaworPower? Consensus-BasedBargainingand Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56(2)
Intern. Org. _ (forthcoming Spring 2002).
22. Houlden et al., supra n. 19, at 16-17.
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In several of their studies, Thibaut and Walker asked some subjects to play the
role of observers, rather than disputants. They found that people observing different
dispute resolution processes shared the preferences of people playing the role of
disputants for adversarial adjudication.
Perhaps the most startling finding of procedural justice research for legal experts
was the discovery that, contrary to what many judges and lawyers believe, 3people's
assessments of dispute resolution processes and outcomes are not wholly dependent
upon each other.24 Specifically, experimental subjects' perceptions of the fairness of
dispute resolution procedures depended on procedural characteristics, not on whether
they won or lost their case or were satisfied with its outcome. People were most
satisfied with dispute resolution procedures when they believed the process was fair
and that it produced a fair outcome. But people were also reasonably satisfied
(although less so than in the former case) with procedures that they perceived to rely
on fair processes when those procedures yielded an outcome that was unfavorable
to them.'s Most importantly, for legal regimes based on a rule of law, people
accorded legitimacy to -- and were willing to comply with the outcomes of -- dispute
resolution procedures when the outcomes were unfavorable to them, as long as they
viewed the processes used as fair.
Writing soon after the 1976 Pound Conference that ushered in the new ADR era
in the courts, Thibaut and Walker interpreted their research results as a refutation of
claims made by some at that Conference that the adversary nature of the American
legal system was contrary to disputants' interests. The researchers also rejected the
notion that the path towards legal reform lay in the direction of more consensual
processes. In a 1979 article that summarized their previous work and presented new
data that confirmed and extended those results, they wrote:
0

[P]ublic dissatisfaction with the courts indeed can be reduced, as
Pound believed, by alterations in court procedures; contrary to
Pound's belief, however, adoption of nonadversary procedures
would diminish rather than enhance public esteem for the legal
26

process.

23. My assessment ofjudges' and lawyers' beliefs is based on the reaction of numerous professional
legal audiences to my discussion of the results of procedural justice research.
24. Technically, researchers found that evaluations of procedure and evaluations of outcomes
comprised two distinct factors in a principal components factor analysis. See e.g. Laurens Walker,
Stephen LaTour, E. Allan Lind & John Thibaut, Reactions of Participantsand Observers to Modes of
Adjudication, 4 J. of App. Soc. Psychol. 295 (1974); Laurens Walker, E. Allan Lind & John Thibaut,
The Relation Between Proceduraland DistributiveJustice, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1401 (1979); E. Allan Lind
et al., Procedureand Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated Resolution of Conflicts ofInterest,
39 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 643 (1980).
25. This finding has been confirmed by numerous studies. While studies have found that the
importance of procedural fairness varies across situations, in legal disputes perceived procedural fairness
shapes disputants' satisfaction with their experiences as well as their views of the justice system. When
the stakes are high, parties care even more about procedural fairness. See Tom Tyler, The Psychology
of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 3 Negot. J. 367, 369 (1987).
26. Walker, Lind & Thibaut, supra n. 24, at 1420.
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Thibaut and Walker's defense of adversarialism did not go unchallenged. The
leading early critique of Thibaut and Walker's work by Hayden and Anderson
argued that Thibaut and Walker's experimental studies failed to capture the
contextual factors that characterize real disputes and artificially limited people's
procedural choices. Outside the experimental laboratory, Hayden and Anderson
argued, people would reveal different preferences." In a recent challenge to fairnessbased policy arguments, Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow have echoed some of
Hayden and Anderson's methodological criticisms. 2 However, over the past twenty
years, a long line of studies of real world disputes have demonstrated conclusively
that Thibaut and Walker's fundamental insight -- that people's judgments about
dispute resolution procedures derive primarily from their perceptions of procedural
fairness rather than perceptions of outcome favorability -- is not just an artifact of
experimental conditions.293 °
One of these "real world studies," conducted while Lind and I were at RAND, 3
compared tort litigants' evaluations of three common court-based procedures: trial,
judicial settlement conferences, and court-annexed arbitration.32 Consistent with the

27. See e.g. Robert Hayden & Jill Anderson, On the Evaluation ofProceduralSystems in Laboratory
Experiments: A Critiqueof Thibaut and Walker, 3 L. & Hum. Behav. 21 (1979). Hayden and Anderson
also argued that Thibaut and Walker's results reflected cultural predispositions of the American
experimental subjects. This criticism has been explored and largely negated by further research. See
supra text accompanying n. 17. In addition, Hayden and Anderson argued that Thibaut and Walker's
experimental simulations of adversarial and inquisitorial systems were not faithful to real world trial
procedures in the U.S. and Europe. Because my arguments in this article generally do not pertain to the
choice between inquisitorial and adversarial trials, I have not pursued this point. For early critical
analysis of Thibaut and Walker's work, see William Austin et al., Effect ofMode of Adjudication,
PresenceofDefense Counsel,and Favorabilityof Verdicton Observers'Evaluationofa CriminalTrial,
11 J. App. Soc. Psychol. 281 (1981).
28. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairnessvs. Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (2001).
29. For a review of this research, see Tom Tyler & E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice, in Handbook
ofJustice Research in Law 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., Kluwer/Plenum 2001).
30. Hayden and Anderson also warned policymakers against designing dispute resolution procedures
to match disputants' preferences as revealed in Thibaut and Walker's studies. Those studies, they noted,
failed to measure the monetary and non-monetary costs of adversary systems, including the distortion
of facts that may result from an adversarial pursuit of dispute resolution, the subordination of disputants'
interests to those of their lawyer-advocates, and the impairment of pre-existing relationships between
disputants. Id. See Hayden & Anderson supran. 27, at 32-33. Hayden and Anderson's concerns about
assuring disputant control over the dispute resolution process and maintaining relationships among
disputants presage the concerns ofADRproponents. However, the third cost that they attach to following
Thibaut and Walker's recommendations - distortion of fact-finding - has generally been ignored by
ADR proponents, some of whom argue that disputants should adopt a problem-solving orientation to
dispute resolution that does not depend on the factual basis of the dispute.
31. See Lind supran. 11; E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants Evaluations
of theirExperiences in the Civil JusticeSystem, 24 L. & Society Rev. 953 (1990).
32. We conducted thirty minute telephone interviews with plaintiffs and defendants in tort cases that
had been resolved in the preceding twelve months in three mid-Atlantic region suburban courts. In one
court, if litigants could not negotiate a settlement of their case, it would be tried; in a second, nonbinding arbitration was a pre-condition for securing a place on the trial calendar; in the third, judicial
settlement conferences were required one month prior to the trial date. In the first court, litigants could
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experimental research conducted in laboratories, we found that litigants' satisfaction
with the dispute resolution system and the court was strongly dependent on
perceived procedural fairness. Regardless of how their cases were resolved, litigants
felt more positive about the system when they believed the process had been fair.
(Litigants who were satisfied with the outcome and believed the process was fair
were the most satisfied.). Perceptions of procedural fairness were highest for trial
and non-binding arbitration and lowest for judicial settlement conferences.
Multivariate analysis of factors explaining perceptions ofprocedural fairness showed
that the most important factors were litigants' perceived control over the process and
their perceptions that theprocess was careful, thorough and unbiased" and that they
were treated in a dignified fashion.
Process characteristics that have received a good deal of attention in the dispute
resolution literature, such as perceived formality versus informality and perceived
privacy were unrelated to perceptions of procedural fairness.
The study contradicted some of the conventional wisdom about civil dispute
resolution. For example, litigants liked trials. Trial litigants gave the highest ratings
of comprehensibility to the process, followed by litigants whose cases were
arbitrated and those whose cases were assigned to judicial settlement conferences.
Defendants were as comfortable when their cases were tried as when they were
arbitrated, although plaintiffs were more comfortable with arbitration. Defendants
were particularly pleased to be given an opportunity to vindicate themselves publicly
at trial (even when they lost their cases). From the perspective of litigants, trials and
arbitration seemed equally dignified. Litigants whose cases were tried gave
somewhat higher ratings of formality to the process than litigants whose cases were
arbitrated, but the degree of formality did not appear to be important to them, as long
as the decision-makers seemed to proceed with care.
In contrast, litigants had rather negative perceptions of the fairness of judicial
settlement conferences, from which they were almost always excluded. Sitting
outside the judge's chambers, they wondered what was going on behind closed
doors, and sometimes distrusted their lawyers' descriptions of the proceedings. Not
surprisingly, they were more distrustful about these descriptions when they had less
trust in their attorney overall. In this jurisdiction (as in many others at the time),
judicial settlement conferences offered no opportunity to the litigant to be heard and
no opportunity to judge how much attention the judge was giving to one side relative

reach trial within six months of the case being declared ready by the attorneys, meaning that trial was
a viable alternative to settlement (at least with regard to timing). In the second, trial was also available
within a short period of time, but arbitration had long been mandated as a more expeditious way to hear
the case. Brief hearings were held in small jury deliberation rooms in the courthouse before panels of
three arbitrators, who subsequently delivered their decision in writing, without offering findings of fact

or legal rulings. The third court had fairly serious congestion problems, meaning that it could take up
to three years to reach trial. But judicial settlement conferences were scheduled for a month before trial,
so parties who could not reach settlement were assured of a courtroom shortly thereafter. To control for
selectivity effects, we contrasted each procedure with its most common alternative, bilateral bargaining.
33. This perception was related in turn to litigants' belief that third party decision-makers were
unbiased and paid equal attention to all parties.
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to the other. There was little evidence that the litigant was regarded as an important
member of the society -- or even an important participant in the dispute!
Importantly, the fact that litigants were excluded from the process did not prevent
them from making judgments about the likely fairness of what was going on behind
closed doors.
At the same time as Thibaut and Walker and their students were exploring
preferences for different dispute resolution procedures, another group of researchers
- seemingly working quite separately -- were investigating the conditions for
successful third party intervention in disputes. These researchers sought ways to help
disputants avoid impasse and maximize joint gains from negotiation. Using
experimental methods similar to Thibaut and Walker's, researchers such as Jeffrey
Rubin examined the effects of timing and mode of intervention on the likelihood of
disputants' reaching resolution, the time required to reach resolution and the quality
of outcomes.' One of the key findings of this line of research was that the
effectiveness of intervention depended on the intensity of conflict: when disputants'
interests were directly antagonistic and when disputants saw themselves as
competitors, intervention was often counter-productive."
Thibaut and Walker had speculated the preferences for adversarial adjudication
they had observed might reflect people's intuition that bargaining and nonauthoritative third party intervention (e.g. mediation) would prove fruitless in high
intensity conflicts, where parties' interests are directly at odds with each other. Rubin
and colleagues' findings were consistent with this intuition. Many of the cases
Thibaut and Walker used in their laboratory experiments appeared to exemplify high
intensity conflicts. Some wondered whether civil litigants whose disputes centered
on money damages -- arguably, lower intensity conflicts -- would prefer nonadversarial modes of dispute resolution that left control over outcomes in their hands
over adversarial adjudication. To explore this question, Heuer and Penrod designed
an experiment that compared preferences for different procedures (as defined by
Thibaut and Walker) in high and low intensity conflicts (as defined by Rubin and
colleagues). Heuer and Penrod asked their subjects to rate the various procedures for
"fairness," "pleasantness," "timeliness" and "advantageousness." Contrary to their
hypotheses, they found that subjects in high and low intensity conflicts preferred
adversarial adjudication to other procedural options.36 Heuer and Penrod also

34. For a review of this early social psychological research on bargaining and third party intervention
see Jeffrey Rubin, Experimental Research on Third-Party Intervention in Conflict: Toward Some
Generalizations,87 Psychol. Bull. 379 (1980).
35. Jean Hiltrop & Jeffrey Rubin, Effects of Intervention Mode and Conflict ofInterest on Dispute
Resolution, 42 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 665 (1982).
36. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, ProceduralPreference as a Function of Conflict Intensity, 51 J.
Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 700, 704 (1986). Heuer and Penrod used a criminal law conflict in their
experiment and varied whether the conflict allowed for plea-bargaining or not. To further sharpen the
distinction between conflict circumstances, they manipulated subjects' motivational orientation
(competitive vs. cooperative), time pressure (high vs. low) and strength of position (strong v. weak).
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confirmed the previous findings that perceived process fairness was the best
predictor of what they termed procedural "desirability." "'
Critics of procedural justice research have argued that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to draw any strong inferences from the experimental literature. The
simulations are diverse, ranging from criminal and civil legal disputes to
organizational decision-making to interpersonal conflicts to collaborative tasks
whose "conflict" dimension is questionable. The procedural options that researchers
have offered subjects differ in kind and in description, the variables the researchers
measure are different and the same conceptual variables are measured differently.
My discussion has focused on studies that found that people prefer adjudication to
mediation, but some experimental research has found that subjects prefer mediation
to arbitration (adjudication)." Taken as a whole, however, I do not think that the
empirical work to date provides strong support for the notion that civil disputants
prefer mediation to adversarial litigation and adjudication.
Looking back from the perspective of the ADR movement's success in
transforming the U.S. courts, early procedural justice research findings on legal
disputants' preferences for adversarial adjudication are highly provocative. But,
ironically, by the mid-1980s, just as judges and lawyers were becoming more
interested in the use of consensual processes in court and more questioning of the
value of adversarial process and adjudication, procedural justice researchers turned
their attention to other questions. For the past fifteen years, procedural justice
scholars led by Allan Lind and Tom Tyler have documented the importance of
procedural fairness perceptions to individuals' evaluations of and reactions to social
interactions ranging broadly beyond the courts. Their research has consistently found
that process matters to people, and it is the perceived fairness of processes that
matters most.
Lind and Tyler and colleagues have proposed several competing hypotheses to
explain why people care as much as they do about procedural fairness:
(1) The "voice" hypothesis. According to this hypothesis,
disputants prefer procedures that offer them an opportunity to
voice their needs and opinions and perceive such procedures
as fairer than others because they believe that having a

37. Id. at 707. In a second experiment Heuer and Penrod compared three conflict circumstances: a
non-negotiable dispute, a zero-sum negotiable dispute and an "integrative" dispute that provided an
opportunity for an interest-based settlement At the same time, they substituted a non-legal conflictproducing task for the criminal law dispute they used in the first experiment To me the differences
between the two conflict simulations seem so sharp that they render the comparison between the two
experiments highly questionable.
38. For a review of this literature, see Robert Peirce, Dean Pruitt & Sally Cazja, ComplainantRespondent Differences in ProceduralChoice,4 Intl. J. of Conflict Mgt. 199 (1993). The authors note
that these experimental results are consistent with earlier anthropological research on preferences for
consensual processes in many cultures and suggest that may be because both lines of research focus on
interpersonal and intra-community conflict.
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greater opportunity for voice enhances the likelihood of
obtaining a satisfactory dispute outcome.39
(2) The "groupvalues" or "relational"hypothesis. Disputants
prefer procedures that indicate that they are in good standing
with their social group and see fair procedures as a sign of
respect. (Lind has sometimes termed this the "dignitary
values" hypothesis.)
(3) The 'fairness heuristic" hypothesis. People fear that they
may be exploited by the social group or authoritative
decision-makers but lack the information or ability to assess
whether such exploitation is occurring. As a mental shortcut
or heuristic for determining whether or not they should be
concerned about such exploitation, they rely on their
evaluations of the fairness of the process.'

The "voice" hypothesis derives directly from Thibaut and Walker's original
research, which pointed to the importance of control over process and suggested to
Thibaut and Walker that individuals have an instrumental interest in process control
-- that is, individuals care about process because they believe it shapes outcome. This
hypothesis was disputed by later findings that suggest individuals care about process
even when they have direct control over the outcome -- that is, when they are able
4
to reject the outcome of a dispute resolution procedure (as in mediation). ' Moreover
in one of the more peculiar (and most troubling) results of procedural justice
research, Lind and associates found that individuals preferred procedures that
permitted them to voice their opinions even when they were told that theiropinions
would have no effect43at all on the outcome.42 Tyler dubbed such preferences "value
expressive effects.
Lind and Tyler developed the "relational" or "dignitary values" hypothesis as
a substitute for the voice hypothesis. If individuals' concern about process was not
driven solely or primarily by a desire to ensure a favorable outcome, Lind and Tyler
reasoned that it might instead be a result of a more fundamental concern about their
standing in society. According "due process" to individuals is equivalent to
recognizing their status as members in good standing of their social group, which has
a value to people that is independent of any effect process might have on outcomes.

39. See e.g. E. A. Lind, R. Kanfer & C. Early, Voice, Control and Procedural Justice, 59 J. Pers. &
Soc. Psychol. 952 (1990).
40. The justice heuristic hypothesis is consistent with laboratory research that suggests that when
individuals are given information for assessing the fairness of outcomes prior to a procedure, they use
that information, rather than process information, as a basis for assessing the fairness of the ultimate
outcomes. K. Van de Bos, R. Vermunt & H.A.M. Wilke, Proceduraland DistributiveJustice: what is
fair depends more on what comes first than on what comes next, 72 J.Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 95 (1997).
41. Tyler & Lind, supra n. 29, at 75.
42. Lind, Kanfer & Early, supra n. 39, at 957-58.
43. Tyler, supran. 25, at 370.
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More recently, Lind has returned to a more instrumental explanation of
individuals' concern about process. His explanation draws on the work of cognitive
scientists who have found individuals frequently use intellectual shortcuts or
heuristics to make judgments that would otherwise require unreasonable or
unattainable factual investigations. In many instances, Lind argues, individuals have
no basis for assessing the fairness or appropriateness of dispute outcomes. Hence,
they use process characteristics -- which they are comfortable assessing for
themselves -- as a pragmatic basis -- a heuristic -- for assessing the outcome, and
deciding whether to comply with it." The justice heuristic hypothesis is consistent
with laboratory research suggests that when individuals are given information for
assessing the fairness of outcomes prior to a procedure, they use that information,
rather than5process information, as a basis for assessing the fairness of the ultimate
4
outcomes.
Taken together, the results of several decades of procedural justice research
validate the concerns about process values that have animated the ADR movement.
My question is whether legislators' and judges' choice of mediation as the procedure
that most gratifies these concerns is well grounded. When I look to the findings of
the first generation of procedural justice scholars, I see little to support this choice.
Thibaut & Walker's early studies found that subjects playing the roles of legal
disputants preferred adversarial adjudication to procedures that ceded control over
process to neutral third parties (e.g. inquisitorial trials) and to procedures that left
control over outcomes in the hands of parties (e.g. mediation). The RAND study
found that real-world civil litigants accorded higher procedural fairness to nonbinding arbitration and trial than to judicial settlement conferences. Some
experimental studies that found people prefer mediation to binding and advisory
adjudication under some circumstances turn out to have used descriptions of
mediation that look more like non-binding arbitration than like mediation as
practiced by evaluative or facilitative mediators. When researchers describe
mediation in a way that more resembles contemporary evaluative mediation,
research subjects choose adjudication and mediation over other procedures, with
similar frequencies.
The implications of more recent research focusing on why perceived procedural
fairness matters for choices between dispute resolution procedures is more
ambiguous. Whether people care about procedural fairness because it has value in
and of itself, or because it signals something about their social status or because it
is perceived to provide information about the fairness of the dispute outcome seems
uncertain to me. Perhaps, procedural fairness matters to people for all these reasons,
or for one reason rather than another in some circumstances but not in others. For
-now, I read this more recent procedural justice literature as telling us that public
policymakers should care about procedural fairness and about the procedural
characteristics that are linked to perceived fairness.

44. E. Allan Lind et al., Individualand CorporateDispute Resolution UsingProceduralFairnessas
a Decision Heuristic, 38 Admin. Sci. Quart. 224, 225 (1993).
45. See Van de Bos et al., supra n. 40, at 99, 102.
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What are these factors? The research to date has not thoroughly explored this
question. But some of the factors that emerge from the RAND study as important to
perceptions of procedural fairness are: (1) lack of bias, defined as a neutral's evenhandedness in listening and paying attention to each side's evidence; (2)
thoroughness, defined as the amount of attention given to the facts of the dispute;
and (3) "dignitary values," defined as the degree of care neutrals accord the process.
Participation does not seem to be valued explicitly by litigants. But implicitly
participation matters because litigants' ability to assess the other qualities of the
procedures that they care about is critically dependent on their observing the
process.' 6
A consistent finding across studies is that litigants want a chance to "tell their
side of the story" -- that is, to present their versions of the facts underlying the
dispute. Some ADR proponents have cited this finding in arguing for dispute
resolution procedures, including mediation, that permit litigants to voice their
concerns -- which practitioners sometimes term "venting." But as I have discussed,
RAND found that litigants' assessment of procedural fairness was not based on
whether they had an opportunity to participate in the process (e.g. vent), but rather
on their perceptions of the carefulness and neutrality of the third party and the
dignity of the process. These findings suggest that civil litigants do not simply want
to tell their stories but also want to be heard.
I think the RAND study, as well as the early research by Thibaut and Walker,
which emphasized the treatment of evidence, suggest also that people want neutral
third parties to resolve their disputes on the basis of thefacts. Thibaut and Walker's
research, and that of their followers', did not inquire into people's preferences with
regard to the normative basis on which these facts should be judged. The question
of whether (and when) people prefer dispute resolution based on public legal norms
to dispute resolution based on ad hoc privately negotiated norms unfortunately has
not been subjected to much investigation to date. This seems like a grievous lack to
me, because the assumption that people prefer treating disputes as problems to be
solved, rather than as conflicts to be resolved according to publicly adopted norms,
is central to mediation ideology. But I read Sally Merry and Susan Silbey's research
on why Americans take disputes to court as suggesting that at least through the mid1980s litigants expected legal disputes to be resolved on the basis of public norms -that is what they thought "justice" was about.4 Moreover, I think the legitimacy that
people accord the courts -- which is essential to a rule of law -- is dependent on the
courts offering the opportunity to resolve disputes on the basis of facts and law,
using fair, thorough, and dignified procedures, to all who seek it.

46. Lind et al., supra n. 11, at 61-67; Lind et al., supra n. 31, at 972-73.
47. Sally Merry and Susan Silbey argued similarly a number of years ago. Based on interviews with
urban residents who brought civil disputes to court, they concluded: "[At the point a lawsuit is filed] the
grievant wants vindication, protection of his or her rights (as he or she perceives them) an advocate to
help in the battle, or a third party who will uncover the 'truth' and declare the other party wrong." Sally
Merry & Susan Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 151 Just. Sys.
J. 151 (1984). See also Sally Engle Merry, GettingJustice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness
Among Working-Class Americans (U. of Chicago Press 1990).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

15

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 5
[Vol. 2002, No. I
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION
IV. RETHINKING COuRT ADR
In their enthusiasm for helping people resolve their disputes in a less conflictoriented fashion, I worry that courts may erode their legitimacy. In most trial courts
today, there are few trials. In many trial courts, parties are required to mediate; in a
growing number of appellate courts, litigants are urged to do likewise. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that in order to persuade parties to accept a settlement many
mediators paint trials in the most negative light possible. Even in jurisdictions and
cases in which trials could be had relatively quickly and relatively efficiently -- and
notwithstanding evidence that ordinary litigants can understand trials and may not
find them particularly emotionally taxing -- litigants are told that they should avoid
trial at all costs. Lawyers who fear the risk of a negative outcome may join mediators
in urging this view of the public adjudication process upon their clients. Some judges
also have joined in the chorus of anti-trial rhetoric, urging upon the parties and the
public a view of adjudication that dismisses the importance of fact- and law-based
dispute resolution.48 I think we need to think harder about what we are giving up in
the effort to persuade people to choose conciliation over litigation, we need to think
more carefully about what constitutes fair alternative dispute resolution procedures,
and we need to rethink the role of fact- and law-based dispute resolution in the
courts.
What would a court ADR program that accorded greater legitimacy to fair,
thorough and dignified fact- and law-based dispute resolution look like? First, it
would be a program that assumed that some civil lawsuits disputes need and ought
to be tried, because there is a legitimate dispute in these cases on the facts or law,
because a dispute resolution system based on negotiation requires some adjudication
to provide the "shadow of the law" that is necessary for efficient bargaining, and
because there are values associated with public trials that are important to some
litigants. In short, it would not regard trial as a "failure" of the legal system. This
means that sufficient resources would have to be allocated by legislative bodies to
enable courts to try cases reasonably quickly after they were filed, and judges would
need to manage efficiently pretrial and trial processes so that the costs of the process
were not so enormous as to make trial effectively inaccessible. Judges and lawyers
would have to join in persuading legislatures of the importance of providing
adequate resources to courts. Unfortunately, contemporary dispute resolution
rhetoric seems to have persuaded legislatures instead that mediation is a panacea for
increased demands on court resources.

48. See e.g. Neary v. Regents of the U. ofCalifornia, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 864-65 (Cal. 1992) (The
primary purpose of the public judiciary is 'to afford a forum for the settlement of litigable matters
between disputing parties.' [citation omitted] We do not resolve abstract legal issues, even when
requested to do so. We resolve real disputes between real people. This function does not undermine our
integrity or demean our function. By providing a forum for the peaceful resolution of citizens' disputes,
we provide a cornerstone for ordered liberty in a democratic society ....The Court of Appeal's concern
for the integrity of trial court judgments is flawed ....The notion that such judgment is a statement of
legal truth' places too much emphasis on the result of litigation rather than its purpose .... The
paramount purpose of litigation is to resolve disputes.").
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Second, a court ADR program that saw its primary role as providing fact- and
law-based dispute resolution would look to lawyers, not mediators, to resolve most
lawsuits before trial. It would be the responsibility of lawyers -- not mediators -- to

help their clients understand their underlying interests and to choose among the
range of options available for resolving disputes both outside and in court. When
lawyers and their clients chose litigation, it would be the responsibility of lawyers -not mediators -- to make realistic assessments of the strength of their cases, to
perform accurate cost-benefit analyses of their litigation options and to advise their
clients accordingly. The measure of success of dispute resolution training in law
school would be that more lawyers could more effectively advise their clients on
when litigation is and is not appropriate, and when they chose litigation, that more
of these lawyers could negotiate effectively resolution of legal disputes in the
shadow of the law. Dispute resolution programs would celebrate the lawyers who
did not need mediation to achieve good outcomes for their clients, rather than the
lawyers who took every case to mediation.
Third, a court ADR program that accorded greater legitimacy to fair, thorough
and dignified process and fact- and law-based dispute resolution would offer lawyers
who were unable to achieve resolution in bilateral negotiation and parties who
wanted an opportunity for a hearing a variety of dispute resolution optionsfocusing
on the facts and law pertaining to their dispute. These options would include

evaluative mediation, non-binding arbitration, early neutral evaluation (ENE),
summary jury trial -- even old-fashioned judicial settlement conferences -- as well

as bench and jury trials. The options would not include pure interest-based mediation
in which neutrals urge parties to set aside the facts and legal issues pertaining to their
disputes and focus instead on their underlying interests in order to achieve an
integrative outcome and to preserve relationships. Nor would the options include
transformative mediation, in which neutrals encourage parties to set aside their
dispute and focus instead on better understanding themselves and opposing parties
and more effectively communicating their needs and perspectives to each other.49
I oppose courts incorporating pure interest-based mediation in their ADR
programs because the inquiry into interests carries the potential for mediators to veer
from a neutral stance or to appear to be veering away from neutrality, in the absence
of the discipline provided by legal norms. Notwithstanding the potential value of this
process to some litigants in some circumstances, I think court officers engage in such
inquiry at the risk of losing their neutrality or appearingto lose it. I am also skeptical
about the notion that a generalist mediator who spends only a brief time with parties
and their attorneys could accurately discern their "true" interests. Lawyers who wish
49. As a practical matter, lawyers and parties sometimes may identify integrative components of legal
dispute resolution as a result of mediation. See Dwight Golann, Is Legal Mediation Really a Repair
Process? Or a Separation?, 19 Altem. to High Costs of Litig. 171 (2001). There may also be
"transformative" moments during the mediation process. I am not arguing against the possibility of
integrative solutions and transformation in court ADR processes. Rather, I am arguing that it is
inappropriate for courts to educate citizens to believe that these are the primary goals of a public justice
system, and to direct the court's energies towards achieving these goals rather than fact- and law-based
dispute resolution.
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assistance in interest-based negotiation should seek out private facilitative mediators
outside the courts, and these mediators should compete in a free market for such
business, rather than using the courts to build and maintain their businesses.
I oppose courts incorporating pure transformative mediation in their ADR
programs because I do not believe self-realization and self-empowerment are
appropriate goals for a public justice system. Parties who wish assistance in selfempowerment and in honing their communication skills should seek out
professionals who are trained to provide this assistance; professionals who will more
likely be found within the therapeutic community than in the bar.
I recognize that my views run counter to the notion of courts as "comprehensive
dispute resolution centers." It may be in the interest for government to subsidize such
centers. However, I think by transforming courts into dispute resolution centers
where facts and law need not matter we run the risk of finding ourselves without an
institution that has the political legitimacy to make fact- and law-based decisions
when we need them.
Among the procedures that I think it is appropriate for courts to provide, none
would be accorded more legitimacy or more support by the courts, and private
practitioners who served as neutrals would receive the same hourly fees, regardless
of the process. Courts would give parties accurate descriptions of the options,
focusing on the differing opportunities they offer for parties to participate and to
obtain a third party opinion on the proper outcome of the dispute, as well as their
possible cost consequences. Evaluative mediation would invite the participation of
parties and provide an opportunity for parties to present their versions of the facts
of the dispute, as well as to observe their lawyers interact with the mediator and
opposing counsel and parties. Evaluative mediators would abjure arguments to settle
based on a "parade of horribles" pertaining to trial, and settlement techniques that
depend on "wearing down" parties' resistance to settling. The purpose of evaluative
mediation would be to overcome cognitive barriers to negotiation that prevent parties
and their agents from perceiving that there is a mutually acceptable convergence of
their positions. Early neutral evaluation would not be merely another opportunity
for a settlement conference, but -- as originally envisaged by the trial court in the
Northern District of California -- an occasion for an expert neutral to meet with
parties and their lawyers to assist in identifying the factual and legal issues upon
which the dispute turns, and developing a pretrial plan that focuses on resolving
these issues. Judicial settlement conferences would include litigants, rather than
leaving them to sit on benches in the court corridor, wondering what is happening
in the judge's chambers.
Courts would take responsibility for the quality of neutrals and the quality of all
dispute resolution processes. Practitioners who wished to offer their services to court
ADR programs would accept the courts' authority to review their credentials as
mediators, arbitrators, etc. and to impose quality control standards, including
maintaining disciplinary processes. Courts would inform parties of such standards
and processes, to enhance their confidence in the fairness of the courts' procedures.
Mediators and other practitioners who felt that such constraints were unacceptable
could compete for business on the open market outside the court. Additional fees that
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might be associated with court-offered procedures would be established by law or
rule, after public debate.
Courts would not require parties to participate in any of these dispute resolution
processes and would make certain that parties understand that they have a right to
bypass all ADR procedures and to take their disputes to trial (subject to ordinary
summary judgment and dismissal rulings). The value of dispute resolution
procedures would be judged by whether lawyers and parties chose to use them, not
by whether they achieved a specified settlement rate -- nor whether they produced
a stream of business for entrepreneurial lawyer-neutrals and retired judges. In sum,
court ADR programs would honor Professor Frank Sander's original vision of the
multi-door courthouse' rather than hustling litigants out the courthouse door and
leaving them subject to the vagaries of the private dispute resolution market. And,
over time, we would learn what procedures litigants actually prefer under different
circumstances.

50. Frank Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Before the National Conference on the
Causes ofPopular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice, 70 F.R.D. 79,111 (1976) (Pound
Conference, Apr. 7-9, 1976).
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